Matching and Price Competition

We develop a model in which firms set their salary levels before matching with workers. Wages fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise almost as much, implying little inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages become compressed. We explore the performance of alternative institutions and discuss the recent antitrust case against the National Residency Matching Program in light of our results

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2004-08-11
Authors:	Levin, Jonathan ; Bulow, Jeremy
Institutions:	Econometric Society
Subject:	matching \| auctions \| market design \| wage competition

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Econometric Society North American Winter Meetings 2004 Number 350
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328996