Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets

This paper explains how and why the Matching Auctions work better with Imperfect Financial Markets. We show that an efficient outsider can obtain a “good” project even if the insider has informational advantage.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Matros, Alexander
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 115.2012, 3, p. 500-503
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Asymmetric information \| Adverse selection \| Winner’s curse \| Takeover game

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041778