Matching with Contracts: An Efficient Marriage Market?
Year of publication: |
2012-11-26
|
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Authors: | Zeng, Chloe Qianzi |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, Oxford University |
Subject: | Matching | two-sided information asymmetry | endogenous sharing rule | marriage market | stochastic marital surplus |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 630 |
Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J12 - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure ; D13 - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation |
Source: |
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Matching with Contracts : An Efficient Marriage Market?
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Matching with contracts : an efficient marriage market?
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