Matching with Quorums
Year of publication: |
2012-05-10
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Authors: | Monte, Daniel ; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu |
Institutions: | School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus |
Subject: | matching | stability | efficiency | serial dictatorship |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | 9 pages long |
Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation ; I20 - Education. General |
Source: |
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Monte, Daniel, (2013)
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