Maximal Domains of Preferences Preserving Strategy-Proofness for Generalized Median Voter Schemes
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Barberà, Salvador ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Medianwähler-Modell | Median voter | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
Description of contents: | Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 16, Iss. 2, January 28, 1999 Volltext nicht verfügbar |
Classification: | D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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