May's theorem in an infinite setting
We generalize May's theorem to an infinite setting, preserving the elementary character of the original theorem. We define voting scenarios and generalized voting scenarios, and prove appropriate versions of May's theorem. The case of generalized voting scenarios specialized to a countably infinite set of voters and the collections of all coalitions that have asymptotic density, shows that majority rule is the only aggregation rule that satisfies neutrality, irrelevance of null coalitions, anonymity, and positive responsiveness.
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Surekha, K. ; Bhaskara Rao, K.P.S. |
Published in: |
Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 46.2010, 1, p. 50-55
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Voting scenario Preference profile Aggregation rule Majority rule Countably many voters |
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