Mean-median compromise method as an innovating voting rule in social choice theory

This paper aims at presenting a new voting function which is obtained in Balinski-Laraki's framework and benefits mean and median advantages. The so-called Mean-Median Comprise Method (MMCM) has fulfilled criteria such as unanimity, neutrality, anonymity, monotonicity, and Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives. It also generalizes approval voting system.

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Year of publication:	2014-12-19
Authors:	Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M. ; Ulungu, Berthold E.-L.
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Aggregation \| Approval Voting \| Borda Majority Count \| Majority Judgment \| Social Choice Function

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in International Journal of Applied Mathematical Research 1.4(2015): pp. 177-182
Classification:	B16 - History of Economic Thought: Quantitative and Mathematical ; C10 - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General. General ; C65 - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011274903