Measuring corruption in the field using behavioral games
Year of publication: |
01 October 2021
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Authors: | Armand, Alex ; Coutts, Alexander ; Vicente, Pedro C. ; Vilela, Inês |
Publisher: |
London : Centre for Economic Policy Research |
Subject: | Corruption | Game | Trust | lab-in-the-field | Citizen | Political leader | incentives | Behavior,Elite capture | Korruption | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Elite | Vertrauen | Confidence | Experiment | Anreiz | Incentives | Führungskräfte | Managers |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten) Illustrationen |
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Series: | Discussion papers / CEPR. - London : CEPR, ZDB-ID 2001019-9. - Vol. DP16596 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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