Measuring influence in command games
In the paper, we study a relation between command games proposed by Hu and Shapley and an influence model. We show that our framework of influence is more general than the framework of the command games. We define several influence functions which capture the command structure. These functions are compatible with the command games, in the sense that each commandable player for a coalition in the command game is a follower of the coalition under the command influence function. For some influence functions we define the command games such that the influence functions are compatible with these games. We show that not for all influence functions such command games exist. Moreover, we propose a more general definition of the influence index and show that some power indices, which can be used in the command games, coincide with some expressions of the weighted influence indices. We show exact relations between an influence function and a follower function, between a command game and commandable players, and between influence functions and command games. An example of the Confucian model of society is broadly examined.
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Grabisch, Michel ; Rusinowska, Agnieszka |
Institutions: | HAL |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Social networks: Prestige, centrality, and influence (Invited paper)
Rusinowska, Agnieszka, (2011)
-
A model of influence based on aggregation functions
Grabisch, Michel, (2011)
-
A model of influence with a continuum of actions
Grabisch, Michel, (2011)
- More ...