Mechanim design with renegotiation and costly messages
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Evans, Robert A. |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an internat. society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 80.2012, 5, p. 2089-2104
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Subject: | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Kommunikation | Communication | Kosten | Costs | Theorie | Theory |
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