Mechanism design by an informed principal : private values with transferable utility
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mylovanov, Tymofiy ; Tröger, Thomas |
Published in: |
The review of economic studies. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0034-6527, ZDB-ID 209928-7. - Vol. 81.2014, 4, p. 1668-1707
|
Subject: | Mechanism design | Informed principal | Private values | Quasi-linear pay-offs | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory |
-
Optimal procurement mechanisms for assembly
Hu, Bin, (2018)
-
An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
Balkenborg, Dieter, (2015)
-
Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
Mylovanov, Timofiy, (2012)
- More ...
-
A note on Zheng’s conditions for implementing an optimal auction with resale
Mylovanov, Tymofiy, (2005)
-
Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information
Mylovanov, Tymofiy, (2008)
-
A Characterization of the Conditions for Optimal Auction with Resale
Mylovanov, Tymofiy, (2006)
- More ...