Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons
Akira Yamada; Naoki Yoshihara
| Year of publication: |
2008
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Yamada, Akira ; Yoshihara, Naoki |
| Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 11.2008, 4, p. 253-270
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| Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Qualifikation | Occupational qualification | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Theorie | Theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003645916