Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers : an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Guo, Huiyi |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 183.2019, p. 76-105
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Subject: | Ambiguous transfers | Bayesian (partial) implementation | Budget balance | Correlated beliefs | Full surplus extraction | Individual rationality | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Erwartungsbildung | Expectation formation | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory |
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