Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers : an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
Year of publication: |
2019
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---|---|
Authors: | Guo, Huiyi |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 183.2019, p. 76-105
|
Subject: | Ambiguous transfers | Bayesian (partial) implementation | Budget balance | Correlated beliefs | Full surplus extraction | Individual rationality | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Rationalität | Rationality | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Erwartungsbildung | Expectation formation | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Entscheidungstheorie | Decision theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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