Mechanism design with endogenous information
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Roesler, Anne-Katrin |
Published in: |
Four essays in microeconomic theory. - 2015, p. 82-98
|
Subject: | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory |
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