Mechanism design with maxmin agents : theory and an application to bilateral trade
Year of publication: |
September 2016
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Authors: | Wolitzky, Alexander |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 11.2016, 3, p. 971-1004
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Subject: | Mechanism design | maxmin | ambiguity aversion | bilateral trade | Myerson-Satterthwaite | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE2089 [DOI] hdl:10419/150299 [Handle] |
Classification: | D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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