Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Miller, Nolan ; Pratt, John W. ; Zeckhauser, Richard ; Johnson, Scott |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 136.2007, 1, p. 476-496
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory |
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