Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs
Year of publication: |
March 2015
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Authors: | Chen, Jing ; Micali, Silvio |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 156.2015, p. 77-102
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Subject: | Incomplete information | Single-good auctions | First-order beliefs | Conservative beliefs | Unvollkommene Information | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Erwartungsbildung | Expectation formation | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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