Mechanism Design with Renegotiation and Costly Messages
Year of publication: |
2006-03
|
---|---|
Authors: | Evans, R. |
Institutions: | Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge |
Subject: | Implementation with Renegotiation | Incomplete Contracts | Hold-up problem | Communication Costs |
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