Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatis.

This paper studies how the independence and conservatism of a central bankrelate to the structure and stability of median voter preferences. This is done by means of a model of endogenous delegation in which an opportunistic policy-maker chooses the monetary regime (independence and conservatism) to maximise the welfare of median voter.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Lippi, F.
Institutions:	Banca d'Italia
Subject:	CENTRAL BANKS \| ELECTIONS \| MEDIAN VOTER

Check Google Scholar |

More access options

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Series:	Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	26 pages
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005640902