Mediators Enable Truthful Voting
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem asserts the impossibility of designing a non-dictatorial voting rule in which truth-telling always constitutes a Nash equilibrium. We show that in voting games of complete information where a mediator is on hand, this troubling impossibility result can be alleviated. Indeed, we characterize families of voting rules where, given a mediator, truthful preference revelation is always in strong equilibrium. In particular, we observe that the family of feasible elimination procedures has the foregoing property.
Year of publication: |
2007-04
|
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Authors: | Peleg, Bezalel ; Procaccia, Ariel D. |
Institutions: | Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
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