Merger and collusion in contests

Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity properties of the contest success function, and we characterize conditions under which cooperation is profitable.

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Alternative title:	Kollusion und Fusion in Contests
Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Huck, Steffen ; Konrad, Kai A. ; Müller, Wieland
Publisher:	Berlin : Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Subject:	Contests \| merger \| collusion \| promotional competition \| Kampf um Marktanteile \| Kollusion \| Fusion

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Series:	WZB Discussion Paper ; FS IV 01-04
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/51127 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:FSIV0104 [RePEc]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size; Size Distribution of Firms ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307019