Mergers Under Entry
I study merger incentives in a dynamic model under the presence of gradual entry. I consider a repeated game with merger decisions in every period and characterize the set of equilibria. I establish two properties: (i) a merger for monopoly may not be profitable; (ii) a merger in a nonconcentrated industry can be profitable. I illustrate the merger welfare implications in the Cournot model.
Year of publication: |
2005
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Authors: | Pesendorfer, Martin |
Published in: |
RAND Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0741-6261. - Vol. 36.2005, 3, p. 661-679
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Publisher: |
The RAND Corporation |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
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