Merit goods and phantom agents

Besley (1988) is one of the few exceptional articles containing non-welfarist optimal tax devices. Feehan (1990) reports an error in his first-best rules. The present note argues that Besley's second-best rules optimize the welfare of phantom agents rather than the corrected welfare of real existing agents in society.

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Year of publication:	2003-07-01
Authors:	Capéau, Bart ; Ooghe, Erwin
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 8.2003, 8, p. 1-5
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	merit goods

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue ; I3 - Welfare and Poverty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629440