Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions

This paper investigates the number of profiles at which a social choice function is manipulable. It is found that there is a lower bound on this number when the social choice function is assumed non-dictatorial. Also, any number between this lower bound and the maximal number of profiles may be obtained as the number of manipulable profiles of some social choice function.

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Year of publication:	1998-06-02
Authors:	Fristrup, Peter ; Keiding, Hans
Published in:	Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 15.1998, 3, p. 455-467
Publisher:	Springer

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Extent:	application/pdf application/postscript
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: 30 November 1993 / Accepted: 14 April 1997
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596397