Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games
Year of publication: |
1996
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fishburn, Peter C. |
Other Persons: | Brams, Steven J. (contributor) |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 13.1996, 4, p. 397-417
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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