Minimizing shirking in auctions and tournaments
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Cohen, Chen ; Schwartz, Moshe |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics letters. - Irvine, Calif. : Scientific Research, ISSN 2162-2078, ZDB-ID 2657454-8. - Vol. 3.2013, 4, p. 197-201
|
Subject: | Tournaments | Auctions | Nash Equilibrium | Soccer | Draws | All-Pay-Contests | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Fußball | Football | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Auktion | Auction | Profisport | Professional sports | Wettbewerb | Competition |
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