Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games and Spillover Stability

This paper discusses minimum cost spanning tree games and argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some flaws. A new model of spillover games is presented, in which each agent's decision whether or not to cooperate is properly taken into account.

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Year of publication:	2011-01
Authors:	Hendrickx, Ruud ; Thijssen, Jacco ; Borm, Peter
Institutions:	Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York
Subject:	minimum cost spanning tree problems \| transferable utility games \| spillovers

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008783905