Minimum participation rules and the effectiveness of multilateral environmental agreements
Year of publication: |
2001
|
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Authors: | Rutz, Samuel |
Publisher: |
Zurich : ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research |
Subject: | Internationale Umweltpolitik | Internationales Abkommen | Partizipation | Spieltheorie | Theorie |
Series: | Economics Working Paper Series ; 01/22 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3929/ethz-a-004296584 [DOI] 360049028 [GVK] hdl:10419/171466 [Handle] |
Source: |
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Minimum participation rules and the effectiveness of multilateral environmental agreements
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