Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution

We extend the analysis carried out by Valletti (2000) by considering an environmental externality in a vertically differentiated duopoly where firms compete à la Cournot with fixed costs of quality improvement.We show that, if the weight of the external effect is high enough, the resulting minimum quality standard is indeed binding

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Lambertini, Luca
Other Persons:	Tampieri, Alessandro (contributor)
Publisher:	[2011]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Produktqualität \| Product quality \| Duopol \| Duopoly \| Nichtpreiswettbewerb \| Non-price competition \| Regulierung \| Regulation \| Fixkosten \| Fixed costs

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (10 p)
Series:	Quaderni DSE Working Paper ; No. 749
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 10, 2011 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1839344 [DOI]
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L51 - Economics of Regulation ; Q50 - Environmental Economics. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125252