Minimum wage restrictions and employee effort in incomplete labor markets: An experimental investigation
A minimum wage raises average wages along with modest increases in employees' average effort levels, generating a Pareto improvement in social welfare. The minimum wage reduces effort in the neighborhood of the minimum, but has no systematic effect on effort levels at higher wages. As a consequence average effort increases modestly with a minimum wage as it raises average wages. Similar results are reported within groups, both when introducing and eliminating a minimum wage, although the within group effects of introducing a minimum wage are stronger than dropping it.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Owens, Mark F. ; Kagel, John H. |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681. - Vol. 73.2010, 3, p. 317-326
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Minimum wage Effort response Gift exchange Experiment |
Saved in:
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