Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
This paper analyzes the implementation of correlated equilibria that are immune to joint deviations of coalitions by cheap-talk protocols. We construct a cheap-talk protocol that is resistant to deviations of fewer than half the players, and using it, we show that a large set of correlated equilibria can be implemented as Nash equilibria in the extended game with cheap-talk. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in general there is no cheap-talk protocol that is resistant for deviations of half the players.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Heller, Yuval |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 69.2010, 2, p. 394-400
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Non-cooperative games Cheap-talk Correlated equilibrium Strong equilibrium Coalition-proof equilibrium Fault-tolerant distributed computation |
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