Mitigating risk selection in healthcare entitlement programs : a beneficiary-level competitive bidding approach
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Montanera, Daniel ; Mishra, Abhay Nath ; Raghu, T. S. |
Published in: |
Information systems research : ISR. - Linthicum, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5536, ZDB-ID 2027203-0. - Vol. 33.2022, 4, p. 1221-1247
|
Subject: | auction markets | digital markets | electronic procurement | entitlement programs | game theory | health insurance marketplaces | mechanism design | risk selection | simulations | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Krankenversicherung | Health insurance | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung | Public health insurance | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Auktion | Auction |
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