Mixed Bundling in Duopoly
We present a model where producers of complementary goods have the option to practice mixed bundling. In the first stage of a two- stage game, firms choose between a mixed bundling and a non- bundling strategy. In the second stage, firms choose prices. We show that mixed bundling is a dominant strategy for both firms. However, when the composite goods are not very close substitutes, at the bundling-bundling equilibrium both firms are worse off than when they both commit not to practice mixed bundling.
Year of publication: |
1993-11
|
---|---|
Authors: | Economides, Nicholas |
Institutions: | Economics Department, Stern School of Business |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Tying, Bundling, and Loyalty/Requirement Rebates
Economides, Nicholas, (2011)
-
Economides, Nicholas, (2011)
-
The Quest for Appropriate Remedies in the Microsoft Antitrust EU Cases: A Comparative Appraisal
Economides, Nicholas, (2009)
- More ...