Mixed Matching Markets

We introduce a new model for two-sided markets that generalizes stable marriages as well as assignment games. Our model is a further generalization of the model introduced by Eriksson and Karlander [2]. We prove that the core of our model is always non-empty by providing an algorithm that determines a stable solution in O(n4).

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Year of publication:	2008-04
Authors:	Hochstättler, Winfried ; Nickel, Robert ; Schiess, David
Institutions:	School of Economics and Political Science, Universität St. Gallen
Subject:	stable marriage \| assignment game \| core

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2008.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	15 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005797678