Mobilterminierung im Wettbewerb
Summary The regulatory agencies found mobile termination to be monopolistic and adopted a policy of ex ante price regulation in recent years. This paper discusses two structural alternatives putting mobile termination under competitive pressure. The first one is the “receiving-party-pays-principle” where mobile termination is a part of the service bundle puchased by the mobile customer. The second is the proposal of a “mobile termination competition”. It turns mobile termination into a specific competitive market and looks like the optimal economic answer to the mobile termination problem. It works on the consumer as well as on the wholesale level.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Kruse, Jörn |
Published in: |
Review of Economics. - Lucius & Lucius, ISSN 2366-035X, ZDB-ID 2178720-7. - Vol. 60.2009, 1, p. 1-16
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Publisher: |
Lucius & Lucius |
Saved in:
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