Modeling government behavior in collective bargaining: A test for self-interested bureaucrats
This paper tests for self-interested behavior by local-government bureaucrats engaged in collective bargaining with public employee unions. A theoretical model is developed that shows the effect of Niskanen-style bureaucratic self-interest in the two standard bargaining models: the demand-constrained model and the efficient-bargain model. These predictions are then tested using national cross-section data on unionized police, fire, and sanitation workers. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989
Year of publication: |
1989
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Authors: | Brueckner, Jan ; O'Brien, Kevin |
Published in: |
Public Choice. - Springer. - Vol. 63.1989, 1, p. 15-41
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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