Modelling Reciprocal Trade Liberalization: The Political-economy and National-welfare Perspectives
We present results of recent research that provides a positive theory of reciprocal trade liberalization policies by governments with political support concerns. The exchange of market access permits governments to benefit each others' exporters, thereby reciprocally facilitating political-support enhancing income transfers that could not have been made unilaterally. In contrast to the optimum tariff-bargaining literature, our explanation of reciprocal liberalization is consistent with the political-economy explanation of protection, and with the objectives of international trade negotiators who seek to improve foreign market access for their exporters in exchange for "concessions" in opening the access to domestic markets.
Year of publication: |
1995
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hillman, Arye L. ; Long, Ngo Van ; Moser, Peter |
Published in: |
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES). - Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik / Société Suisse d"Économie et de Statistique - SGVS/SSES, ISSN 0303-9692. - Vol. 131.1995, III, p. 503-515
|
Publisher: |
Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik / Société Suisse d"Économie et de Statistique - SGVS/SSES |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Modelling reciprocal trade liberalization : the political-economy and national-welfare perspectives
Hillman, Arye L., (1995)
-
Risk aversion, terms of trade uncertainty and social-consensus trade policy
Cassing, James Howard, (1986)
-
Hillman, Arye L., (2018)
- More ...