Moderation of an ideological party
It is a common fear in many countries that ideological parties will come to power through elections but will implement extreme policies. Many countries cope with this problem by overriding the election results when such parties are elected. We demonstrate that the alternative approach of containing these parties within the democratic system is more effective. We show that, as the probability of state's intervention in the next elections increases, an ideological party implements a more extreme policy in equilibrium. This hurts the median voter. Our main result shows that from the median voter's perspective, the optimal intervention scheme can be implemented by committing not to intervene and adjusting election times appropriately. That is, elections are a better incentive mechanism than the threat of a coup.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Pokladniková, Vlasta ; Yildiz, Muhamet |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 65.2009, 2, p. 516-537
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Moderation Ideological parties Elections Coup |
Saved in:
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