Monetary institutions, imperfect competition and employment outcomes
Abstract This paper explores the employment effects of strategic interactions between firms, trade unions and monetary institutions in the context of an imperfectly competitive macroeconomic model with right-to-manage bargaining. The results suggest that the employment effect of joining a monetary union is conditional upon the degree of monetary accommodation of the union-wide central bank, the degree of product market competition, and the relative bargaining power in wage-setting. In addition, the employment effect of a change in the degree of monetary accommodation of the domestic or the union-wide central bank is conditional upon the degree of product market competition and the distribution of bargaining power.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Chouliarakis, George ; Correa-López, Mónica |
Published in: |
The North American Journal of Economics and Finance. - Elsevier, ISSN 1062-9408. - Vol. 22.2011, 2, p. 131-148
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Monetary union Monetary policy Oligopoly Wage bargaining Employment |
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