Monetary policy goals and central bank independence

During recent years a strong body of academic literature has argued that central bank independence (CBI) is necessary in order to achieve and maintain low inflation. This appears to support the view of central bankers that they should have the autonomy to pursue policy objectives without being pressured by short-term political objectives. The treatment of policy goals and the issue of policymakers' inflationary bias within CBI models are reviewed.

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Year of publication:	1995
Authors:	AKHTAR, M.A.
Published in:	Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review. - Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. - Vol. 48.1995, 195, p. 423-439
Publisher:	Banca Nazionale del Lavoro
Subject:	Decision-making \| Models \| Decision making \| Evaluation \| Monetary policy

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects) ; E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765256