Monetary Politics in a Monetary Union: A Note on Common Agency with Rational Expectations

Is the politicisation of monetary policy in a currency union desirable? This paper shows that in a setting where political influence by national governments is modeled as a common agency game with rational expectations, the answer to this question crucially depends on whether the common central bank can commit to follow its policy.

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Year of publication:	2007-09-28
Authors:	Ruta, Michele
Institutions:	Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), European University Institute
Subject:	Common Agency \| Political Pressures \| European Monetary Union

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	RSCAS Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series Working Papers Number 2007/21
Classification:	F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions ; E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212019