Monetary target announcements, reputation and hysteresis : paper presented at the EEA Ninth Annual Congress 1994, Maastricht

Hans Peter Grüner

Two signaling games of monetary policy are considered: game one examines the effect of hysteresis on the labor market on the results of the repeated monetary policy game. Disciplinary effects of reputation disappear in presence of hysteresis. The second game compares weifare effects of monetary target announcements to those of a rigid rule under alternative assumptions on the policymaker's type space.

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Year of publication:	1994
Authors:	Grüner, Hans Peter
Publisher:	Konstanz
Subject:	Signaling Games \| Monetary Policy \| Credibility \| Reputation \| Hysteresis \| Geldpolitik \| Monetary policy \| Glaubwürdigkeit \| Arbeitsmarkt \| Labour market \| Hysterese \| Theorie \| Theory \| Notenbankpolitik \| Inflation \| Beschäftigung \| Gleichgewichtstheorie

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Extent:	52 S. 30 cm
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Konferenzschrift ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/101548 [Handle]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects) ; E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies ; Geld, Inflation, Kapitalmarkt
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009774705