Money talks

We study credible information transmission by a benevolent short-lived central bank. When externalities create a wedge between private and social welfare, the central bank has an incentive to misreport its information. Information transmission through monetary policy creates a distortion, thus, lending credibility.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Hoerova, Marie ; Monnet, Cyril ; Temzelides, Ted
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 116.2012, 3, p. 617-621
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Information \| Interest rates \| Monetary policy

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; E40 - Money and Interest Rates. General ; E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects)
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594064