Monitoring and incentives under multiple-bank lending : the role of collusive threats
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Dam, Kaniṣka ; Chowdhury, Prabal Roy |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 197.2021, p. 1-40
|
Subject: | Counter-cyclical monitoring | Multiple-bank lending | Syndicated lending | Vertical collusion | Theorie | Theory | Kreditgeschäft | Bank lending | Kartell | Cartel | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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