Provision of charging stations is requisite infrastructure supporting the adoption of electric vehicles in any city and country. To avoid duplications and wastage of resources, only one charging station is available at each parking lot, which meant that only one provider is assigned for each carpark or sets of carparks in an area. Given that vehicle owners do not have control over the provider of electricity at charging stations in public carparks, and the huge externalities involved if vehicle owners choose specific carparks with longer walking distance to their destination to enjoy lower electricity charging rates, monopolistic tendency is inherent in the business model of electric car charging market. Specifically, users of charging stations have no choice but to accept a higher electricity charging rate given the need to top up residual charge in their car batteries. This observation holds important implications for policy makers interested in embedding elements of competition in the electric car charging market. One key question concerns how the various carparks are to be tendered to different electricity providers. Another concern is who should provide for the charging station infrastructure in the first place. If the provider of the charging station is also assigned to provide electricity, what should be the maximum duration of the contract to provide electricity to electric vehicle owners? Specifically, what is the pertinent model in which costs and revenue of electric car charging providers could be simulated in a fair and equitable manner for various stakeholders inclusive of vehicle owners, electricity provider, charging station owner, and city authorities? The problem described above is not intractable, but does provide an opportunity for creative policymaking to inject fairness and competition into an otherwise monopolistic market. One possibility involves the decoupling of charging station ownership with electricity provision. Specifically, initial cost of building the charging station network at every parking lot in the city could be borne by the taxpayers through the city authorities, who would own the electric charging network. Subsequently, contracts for provision of electricity to vehicle owners would be tendered where the successful tender would be selected based on bid price for renting the charging network and retail price of electricity. Maximum rate of electricity and minimum rental of charging stations could be set during the tender process where operation of existing charging stations would be reopened for tender every five years to introduce an element of competition into the business model. As described, the situation in managing electric car charging network is different from the current network of petrol stations where the owner of the network also provides the fuel. Specifically, in the petrol station model, vehicle owners have a choice of their preferred provider of fuel as long as they do not run out of fuel on the road. This necessarily meant that an element of competition is present in the petrol provision business where providers compete based on price of fuel, quality of fuel, service quality, and density of petrol station network. Hence, given monopolistic tendency in the electric charging market compared to the petrol provision market, a regulatory model that decouple charging station ownership with provision of electricity on tendered contract would better serve vehicle owners, taxpayers, and city authorities while injecting competition into the charging market on a periodic basis. Interested readers are invited to expand on the ideas described herein