Monopoly Insurance under Adverse Selection When Agents Differ in Risk Aversion
Year of publication: |
1994
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Authors: | Landsberger, Michael ; Meillison, Isaac |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 4105394. - Vol. 63.1994, 2, p. 392-407
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