Monopoly regulation without the Spence-Mirrlees assumption
The paper extends the Baron and Myerson [Baron, D., Myerson, R.B., 1982. Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs. Econometrica 50, 911-930] model of monopoly regulation to bidimensional adverse selection: both the marginal cost and the fixed cost of the monopoly are unknown to the regulator. Like in Araujo and Moreira [Araujo, A., Moreira, H., 2000. Adverse section problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition. Fundação Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, Ensaios Economicos 389], the paper provides an explicit solution of a screening model without the Spence-Mirrlees assumption.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Rochet, Jean-Charles |
Published in: |
Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 45.2009, 9-10, p. 693-700
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Spence-Mirrlees condition Adverse selection Regulation |
Saved in:
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