Monotone Preferences over Information

We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states of nature is monotone, then it is not representable by a utility function.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Dubra, Juan ; Echenique, Federico
Published in:	Topics in Theoretical Economics. - Berkeley Electronic Press. - Vol. 1.2001, 1, p. 1033-1033
Publisher:	Berkeley Electronic Press
Subject:	value of information \| Blackwell´s Theorem \| representation theorems \| monotone preferences

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	oai:bepress:bejte-1033
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005046372