Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ehlers, Lars H. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 114.2004, 2, p. 358-369
|
Subject: | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Koalition | Coalition | Core | Theorie | Theory | Matching |
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