Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit: comment
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Duffee, Greg |
Other Persons: | Berndt, Antje (contributor) ; Gupta, Anurag (contributor) |
Published in: |
Journal of monetary economics. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-3932, ZDB-ID 191155-7. - Vol. 56.2009, 5, p. 744-747
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Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Kreditgeschäft | Bank lending |
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